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COMMERCIAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, which covers 1988 through mid-1989, several
major changes occurred in the field of commercial law. Notably, the
courts have expanded their protection of consumers,1 employees, 2 and
tenants.' In addition, other areas of the law, while not changed dramatically, were clarified. By providing a brief review of each of the
important cases, along with analysis of the import of each case, this
article will bring the reader up to date on the state of commercial law
in New Mexico.
II.

PREMATURE RELEASE OF MORTGAGE

In Los Alamos Credit Union v. Bowling, 4 the supreme court held that
the release of a mortgage resulting from clerical error does not necessarily
relieve a mortgagor's obligation on the note. A prior supreme court
decision held that "it is the intent with which the release is made, not
the making of the release, which controls." ' 6 The Bowling decision clarifies
the issue of mistaken release by adopting the law of other jurisdictions
and holding that a cancellation, release, or surrender of an instrument
is invalid if it is unauthorized or done by mistake.7
Defendants borrowed $65,000 from plaintiff, executing a promissory
note and residential first mortgage as security. 8 To make payments on
the note, defendants preauthorized automatic deductions from their credit
union account. 9 Through a clerical error, an employee marked the original
note and mortgage "Paid."' 1 Under the mistaken belief that defendants
had paid the note, the assistant treasurer executed a release of mortgage
and forwarded the original note, mortgage, and release documents to
2
defendants." One week later, defendants recorded the release.
Plaintiff discovered its error the following month and requested that
the note be reaffirmed and the mortgage reinstated. 3 Defendants refused,

1. Waisner v. Jones, 107 N.M. 260, 755 P.2d 598 (1988); Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell,
107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988). See infra notes 63-82 and 169-89 and accompanying text.
2. Newberry v. Allied Stores, 108 N.M. 424, 773 P.2d 1231 (1989); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil,
108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280 (1988). See infra notes 83-122 and accompanying text.
3. Ramirez-Eames v. Hovar, 108 N.M. 520, 775 P.2d 722 (1989); Easterling v. Peterson, 107
N.M. 123, 753 P.2d 902 (1988). See infra notes 298-324 and accompanying text.
4. 108 N.M. 113, 767 P.2d 352 (1989).
5. Id. at 114, 767 P.2d at 353.
6. Eldridge v. Salazar, 81 N.M. 128, 131, 464 P.2d 547, 550 (1970).
7. Bowling, 108 N.M. at 114, 767 P.2d at 353.
8. Id.at 113, 767 P.2d at 352.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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and they made no further payments toward the outstanding balance. 4
Plaintiffs re-recorded the original mortgage and a foreclosure suit followed. 5 The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.' 6 Defendant appealed. 7
The New Mexico Commercial Code provides that a "holder of an
instrument may even without consideration discharge any party.""' However, the court held that "a cancellation, release, or surrender of the
instrument is ineffective if it is unauthorized, unintentional, or done by
mistake."1 9 Plaintiff closed defendants' original account through clerical
error, and plaintiff's employees stated, by affidavit, that they would not
have executed a release had they known that the note remained unpaid. 20
Since defendants did not dispute these statements, 2' there was no genuine
issue regarding the existence of the obligation. 22 Although plaintiff was
negligent in cancelling and discharging the instrument, the court held
that defendants could not retain a gratuitous benefit to which they were
not entitled.23
The most significant aspect of this case is the court's application of
Section 55-3-605 of the New Mexico Commercial Code to the situation
where a release is given without consideration. Because the court interpreted the statute to mean that a release is ineffective if unauthorized,
unintentional, or done by mistake, there is an additional burden placed
on the discharged party if the release is challenged by the lending institution. Instead of merely relying on the release document, the party
to be discharged must also demonstrate that the instrument was not
released through error, i.e., that the debt had actually been paid. The
Bowling decision offers new protection to New Mexico lenders who
negligently release debtors of their obligations.
III.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

Commercially Reasonable Disposition Of Secured Collateral
During the survey period, New Mexico courts addressed the commercial
reasonableness of a sale in two cases. In one case the court established
some of the factors that will be considered in evaluating the reasonableness

A.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-605 (1978).
19. Bowling, 108 N.M. at 114, 767 P.2d at 353. See also Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dowling, 4 Conn. App. 376, 494 A.2d 1216 (1985); First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Martin, 58 Il. App. 3d 113, 373 N.E.2d 1075 (1978); Richardson v. First National Bank of Louisville,
660 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Reid v. Cramer, 24 Wash. App. 742, 603 P.2d 851 (1979).
20. Bowling, 108 N.M. at 114, 767 P.2d at 353.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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of a sale,1 while in another case the court put those factors to the test. 25
1. Villella Enterprises v. Young
In Villella Enterprises v. Young, 26 the supreme court held that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether disposition of secured
collateral was commercially reasonable. 27 The court was not convinced
that following a default the secured party had conducted a public sale
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner as a matter of
law when he reacquired assets for $150,000 less than a recent offer and
publicized the sale only in a weekly legal periodical. 28 In so doing, the
court established some of the factors that will be considered
in determining
29
the commercial reasonableness of the sale of collateral.
After the defendant had been delinquent in making payments on a
loan secured by personal property, plaintiff sent letters to the defendant
concerning the pattern of the delinquent payments and demanding timely
payments in the future.30 When the defendant's business ceased operation
in late August, plaintiff notified defendant of his election to accelerate
the maturity of the note and repossessed the collateral. 3
Plaintiff informed defendant by letter that all collateral would be sold
at a public sale and published two notices of the sale in the Health City
Sun, a weekly legal periodical.12 Plaintiff, the only buyer at the sale,
purchased the assets for a bid of $80,000.11 Plaintiff filed an action for
the deficiency.3 4 The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment
in plaintiff's favor, and defendant appealed. 5
The supreme court held that when suing for a deficiency, a creditor
must allege and, unless admitted, prove that the disposition of the collateral was commercially reasonable. 6 The court stated that
[iun determining commercial reasonableness, . . . evidence adduced by

the debtor as to any aspect of the sale, including the amount of
advertising done, normal commercial practices in disposing of particular collateral, the length of time elapsing between repossession and
24. Villella Enters. v. Young, 108 N.M. 33, 766 P.2d 293 (1988). See infra notes 26-46 and
accompanying text.
25. Sec. Fed. Say. & Loan v. Prendergast, 108 N.M. 572, 775 P.2d 1289 (1989). See infra notes
47-62 and accompanying text.
26. 108 N.M. 33, 766 P.2d 293 (1988).
27. Id.at 36, 766 P.2d at 296. The court was not convinced that following a default, the secured
party had conducted a public sale of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner when he
reacquired the assets for $150,000 less than a recent offer and publicized the sale only in a weekly
legal periodical. Id. at 37, 766 P.2d at 297.
28. Id. at 37, 766 P.2d at 297.
29. Id. at 35, 766 P.2d at 295 (citing Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc.,
87 N.M. 451, 455, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975)).
30. Villella, 108 N.M. at 35, 766 P.2d at 295.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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resale, whether deterioration of the collateral has occurred, the number
of persons contacted concerning the sale, and even the price obtained,
will be pertinent. 3
Plaintiff made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to summary
judgment because the disposition of the collateral was commercially reasonable.3" However, defendant presented evidence that the fair market
value of the lounge as a closed business was $230,000 and that potential
buyers were willing to pay that amount. 39 The court stated that a debtor
cannot rebut a prima facie case of commercial reasonableness merely by
contending that the price obtained for collateral was too low. 40 The price
obtained is a relevant factor in determining commercial reasonableness,
but in this case, "the price at which the secured party repurchases the
collateral is not a reliable indicator of its fair market value because the
transaction is self-serving." 4' Defendant presented other evidence against
plaintiff's prima facie case including the fact that plaintiff never contacted
the individuals who had offered to purchase the lounge for $230,000,
even though plaintiff knew their identities. 42 Defendant also alleged that
those people who are in the market for purchasing restaurants and lounges
do not generally look in legal periodicals for notice of sale. 43 The court
found defendant's assertions sufficient to establish reasonable doubt that
plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and
reversed and remanded for trial."
Villella clarified the standards by which to measure the commercial
reasonableness of the sale of collateral. Any evidence regarding the sale,
normal commercial practices, number of persons contacted concerning
the sale, and even price obtained, will be considered in deciding the
commercial reasonableness of a sale . 4 Even more importantly, the court
now requires the secured party to take steps, including advertising in the
proper place, to assure that potential buyers are present at a public sale."
2. Security Federal Savings & Loan v. Prendergast
In Security Federal Savings & Loan v. Prendergast,47 the supreme court
held that despite the lack of advertising for the private sale of a mobile
home after repossession, the sale was commercially reasonable.
In 1983, the defendants borrowed over $8,000 from the plaintiff and
signed a promissory note giving the plaintiff a security interest in a 1976

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 36, 766 P.2d at 296.
Id.
Id. at 36-37, 766 P.2d at 296-97.
Id. at 37, 766 P.2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38, 766 P.2d at 298.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
108 N.M. 572, 775 P.2d 1289 (1989).
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mini-mobile home. 48 The defendants defaulted on the note and voluntarily
gave the mobile home to the plaintiff. 49 The plaintiff notified the defendants that it intended to dispose of the mobile home by private sale.50
The plaintiff did not advertise the vehicle for sale but placed the vehicle
on the premises of a used auto dealer. 1 The plaintiff sold the mobile
home and then brought suit to collect a $4,286.02 deficiency. 2 The trial
court awarded the plaintiff the amount of the deficiency,
plus interest
4
and reasonable attorney fees." The defendant appealed.1
The court first outlined the general approach of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to decide whether the lack of advertising made the
sale commercially reasonable. Under the UCC every aspect of the disposition of secured collateral must be commercially reasonable. 6 As in
Villella Enterprises, the court then stated the determination of commercial
reasonableness will turn on the particular facts of each case." 7
The court then Went on to discuss how advertising affects the commercial
reasonableness of a sale. The court found that adequate notice (such as
advertising) to a relevant public is essential in the public sale of collateral."
The court stated that advertising may even play an important role in
certain private sales.5 9
The court found that the UCC specifically recognizes that a private
sale may be used to dispose of collateral, as long as every aspect of the
sale is commercially reasonable. ° The UCC encourages the sale of repossessed collateral through regular commercial channels, such as through
a dealer, as opposed to public auctions, which often yield disappointing
results. 6 ' The court went on to hold that a satisfactory sale through an
automobile dealer can be negotiated without the need for advertising,
and that notice to the public, through advertising or other means, 62is not
always essential when a sale of collateral is privately negotiated.

48. Id. at 573, 775 P.2d at 1290.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 573-74, 775 P.2d at 1290-91.
53. Id.at 574, 775 P.2d at 1291.
54. Id. at 573, 775 P.2d at 1290.
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). The court limited its review to this question,
although the issue on appeal was whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's
findings. The defendants, however, did not build their argument in terms of substantial evidence.
Neither a transcript of the proceedings before the trial court nor the trial exhibits were provided
on appeal. Therefore, the court's review was limited to deciding whether the lack of advertising
was determinative. Prendergast, 108 N.M. at 574, 775 P.2d at 1291.
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
57. Prendergast, 108 N.M. at 574, 775 P.2d at 1291 (citing Villella, 108 N.M. 33, 35, 766 P.2d
293, 295 (1988)).
58. Prendergast, 108 N.M. at 574, 775 P.2d at 1291.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 575, 775 P.2d at 1292. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
61. Prendergast, 108 N.M. at 575, 775 P.2d at 1292.
62. Id.
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B.

A Limitation on Self-Help Repossessions
In Waisner v. Jones,63 the supreme court held that the introduction
of a law enforcement officer into a self-help repossession constituted
state action and resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of the defaulting debtor's rights.6
Credit Union One hired defendant Jones to repossess a pickup truck
from plaintiff Waisner after plaintiff had defaulted on a loan secured
by the truck. 65 The defendant went to the plaintiff's place of employment,
Holloman Air Force Base, to repossess the truck." The base policy
required that a Holloman security police officer accompany the defendant. 67 The defendant and an armed, uniformed, security sergeant encountered the plaintiff during the repossession, and the sergeant informed
the plaintiff that they were there for the truck. 6 The plaintiff relinquished
possession of the truck to the defendant, later claiming
that she feared
69
that the sergeant might arrest her if she refused.
Plaintiff subsequently sued Credit Union One, Otero Federal Credit
Union (the institution which stored the truck following the repossession),
and the defendant for unlawful repossessing and retaining a motor vehicle. 70 The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Otero Federal,
and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Credit Union One and the
defendant. 7 ' Waisner appealed and the court of73 appeals affirmed the trial
court. 72 The supreme court granted certiorari.
In reversing both the trial court and the court of appeals, the supreme
court majority stated that the self-help repossession statute74 normally
falls outside of the constitutional strictures of due process because it is
private in its execution. 7 However, when a law enforcement officer is
introduced into the repossession and that officer confronts the defaulting
party, the private nature of the repossession is compromised.7 6 When the
officer makes his official presence known to the debtor, the officer has
crossed the line of benign attendance at the repossession and there is
state action. 77 As such, the due process requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, as dictated by the fourteenth amendment, are

63. 107 N.M. 260, 755 P.2d 598 (1988).
64. Id. at 264, 755 P.2d at 602.
65. Id. at 261, 755 P.2d at 599.
66. Id. at 262, 755 P.2d at 600.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 261, 755 P.2d at 599.
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-503 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). This section provides that "[uInless otherwise
agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral ...
without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of [the] peace." Id.
75. Waisner, 107 N.M. at 263, 755 P.2d at 601.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 265, 755 P.2d at 603.
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invoked. 7 The majority stated that under these circumstances,
the creditor
79
must seek repossession through judicial process.
The dissent in Waisner argued that while a repossessor may not actively
solicit a third person to aid in a self-help repossession, the mere presence
of an officer conducting passive surveillance to assure the safety of the
repossessor does not necessarily compromise the private nature of a selfhelp repossession. 0 In this case, since base policy required the military
escort, and the defendant did not solicit the officer's help, and since the
officer had no authority to arrest the plaintiff or assist in the repossession,
the dissent found no constitutional violation.,
Waisner is the first New Mexico case to consider whether the involvement of a law enforcement officer in a self-help repossession compromised
the private nature of that repossession. 2 Waisner places a limitation on
the use of self-help repossessions in New Mexico that is consistent with
the spirit of protecting consumers. However, the holding might harm
one class of consumers, i.e., military personnel. The holding could have
a chilling effect on the extension of credit to marginally credit-worthy
military personnel by creditors who may fear more expensive and time
consuming judicially authorized repossessions upon a debtor's default.
IV.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

A.

Employment Terminable-At- Will
In Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil,8 3 the supreme court expanded the exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine and held that an employment relationship is not terminable-at-will if oral statements are made to the
employee implying that termination will not occur without cause. The
oral statements create an implied contract and alter the at-will presumption.S"
Defendant and its subsidiary, Vermejo Park Corporation, employed
plaintiff as the vice-president in charge of guest operations at Vermejo
Park, a northern New Mexico ranch.8" During initial employment negotiations, plaintiff's supervisor clearly stated that the employment would
be long-term, and neither the insurance benefits manual nor the severance
pay plan mentioned the possibility of termination without cause.86 De-

78. Id.at 263, 755 P.2d at 601.
79. Id. at 264, 755 P.2d at 602.
80. Id. at 265, 755 P.2d at 603 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. In reaching its decision, the court was persuaded by similar holdings in Arizona and
Washington. Id. at 263, 755 P.2d at 601 (citing Walker v. Walthall, 121 Ariz. 121, 588 P.2d 863
(Ct. App. 1978); Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler, I Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970)).
83. 108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280 (1988).
84. Id. at 25, 766 P.2d at 285. Prior to the Kestenbaum decision, exceptions to the employmentat-will doctrine were based only upon provisions included in an employee handbook or personnel
manual. See Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980); Francis v. Memorial Gen.
Hosp., 104 N.M. 698, 726 P.2d 852 (1986).
85. Kestenbaum, 108 N.M. at 21, 766 P.2d at 281.
86. Id. at 22, 766 P.2d at 282.
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fendant conceded it had a management
practice of not terminating em87
ployment without good cause.
During the seventh year of plaintiff's employment, defendant received
an anonymous letter accusing plaintiff of sexual harassment, illegal conduct, and mismanagement of the ranch.8 8 Defendant initiated an investigation.8 9 Plaintiff had the opportunity to comment about each allegation
and call witnesses to speak on his behalf.9 Despite plaintiff's denial of
the sexual harassment charge, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. 91
Plaintiff claimed that he had been terminated without a fair investigation. 92 Defendant asserted that plaintiff's oral employment agreement
was for an indefinite period and he was an employee-at-will, who could
be discharged for any or no reason. 93 Defendant further maintained that
even if cause were required, defendant had reasonable grounds to believe
that sufficient cause existed.94 The district court entered judgment in
plaintiff's favor. 95 Defendant appealed.9
Defendant argued that the statute of frauds barred this action because
it was based on an oral employment contract for employment until
retirement, which could not be performed within one year. 97 The court
disagreed, holding that indefinite permanent employment contracts fall
outside the statute of frauds because they are capable of full performance
within one year. 9
Defendant also maintained that no implied contract of employment
existed because, as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, implied contracts must be based on the provisions included in an employee
handbook or personnel manual. 99 However, the court held that the implied
contractual duties of an employer based upon representations or conduct
were not limited to those flowing from handbooks or manuals.'°° Following
decisions in other jurisdictions, the court held that "[o]ral statements
made by an employer may be sufficient to create an implied contract
which provides that an employee shall not be discharged except for
cause."''1 The court found substantial evidence to support the jury finding

87. Id. at 26, 766 P.2d at 286.
88. Id. at 21, 766 P.2d at 281.
89. Id. at 22, 766 P.2d at 282.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 21, 766 P.2d at 281.
96. Id. at 23, 766 P.2d at 283.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 24, 766 P.2d at 284.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)).
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that an implied employment provision existed between the parties to only
terminate employment for good cause. 10 2
Defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed that an
employer needs only a good faith belief regarding an employee's inappropriate conduct and that a finding of illegal conduct by the employee
is cause for discharge. 103 The court rejected this contention and articulated
a middle ground, holding that although employers must base their decision
to terminate employment on information available at the time of discharge,
the employer may be relieved of liability under its implied contract
14
provided it had reasonable grounds to believe that good cause existed. 0
The court held, however, that defendant had not acted upon reasonable
grounds because the investigator admitted that she did not distinguish
first-hand knowledge from mere gossip or rumor, and that the trial court
had properly rejected an instruction suggesting that the jury could find
good cause for termination of employment from the employer's subjective
good faith belief as opposed to an objective standard of reasonable
belief 105
The Kestenbaum decision has far reaching implications for employers
who previously could fire employees-at-will without good cause as long
as there was nothing in writing to the contrary. Under Kestenbaum, there
will be few employees who are truly terminable-at-will. Employers can
still discharge employees subject to an implied contract as long as they
can clearly demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds to believe
that sufficient cause existed to discharge the employee. 1' 6 Standards to
determine whether reasonable grounds exist for discharge remain undefined
and will probably be the focal point of future cases.
Further Consideration of Implied Employment Contracts
The far reaching implications of the court's holding in Kestenbaum'07
were quickly demonstrated in Newberry v. Allied Stores, '8 where the
supreme court held that an employment manual and an employer's conduct
created an implied employment contract. ' 9 Since the employee was not
an employee-at-will, he could be terminated only for good cause. 10
Plaintiff Newberry was terminated from his employment at defendant
Allied Stores for allegedly violating company policy, for stealing company
property, and for gross insubordination."' The plaintiff filed suit alleging,
inter alia, breach of an implied employment contract." 2 The defendant
B.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 26, 766 P.2d at 286.
Id. at 27, 766 P.2d at 287.
Id.
Id.
See
108
108

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 28, 766 P.2d at 288.
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280 (1988).
N.M. 424, 773 P.2d 1231 (1989).
at 428, 773 P.2d at 1235.
at 427, 773 P.2d at 1234.
at 425-26, 773 P.2d at 1232-33.
at 426, 773 P.2d at 1233.
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answered by claiming that the plaintiff did not have an employment
contract; hence he was an employee-at-will who could be terminated for
any reason." 3 The trial court determined that the plaintiff was not an
employee-at-will and found for the plaintiff on the breach of the em-

ployment contract

issue.114

The defendant appealed." 5

The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff was
not an employee-at-will, and that he could only be terminated for good
cause." 6 The court found that the defendant's implied employment contract with the plaintiff was formed by statements in the defendant's policy
manual that an employee could be discharged for rule violations, poor
performance, and other "cause ' " 7 and by defendant's statement to the
plaintiff that the manual was "his bible. ' "1 8 The court found that this
suggested that employees would only be terminated for a reason."19 Notwithstanding its holding, the court reversed the trial court's judgment in
favor 20
of the plaintiff because the plaintiff was terminated for good

cause. 1

Newberry must be read with Forrester v. Parker,2 ' which stated that
a personnel manual can give rise to an implied employment contract,
and with the more recent holding in Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil,2 2 which
stated that parties can create an implied employment contract based on
their intent and conduct. The result in Newberry sends a clear warning
to employers that their personnel manuals and the emphasis placed on
the employee's use of those manuals can legally reclassify an at-will
employee as a contract employee who can only be terminated for cause.
V.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS

In Levy v. Disharoon,'23 the supreme court interpreted the rights and
liabilities of a dissolving partnership as issues of first impression under
the Uniform Partnership Act, 24 and held that (1) in a suit in equity for
accounting between partners, the court has jurisdiction to enter a money
judgment against one of the partners; 21 (2) a partner who voluntarily
terminates his contractual relationship with the other partner is not entitled
to any net profits accrued after the date he left the partnership;' 26 and
(3) an award of a money judgment to a third party before all the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427, 773 P.2d at 1234.
Id. at 428, 773 P.2d at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
93 N.M. 781, 606 P.2d 191 (1980).
108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280 (1988). See supra notes 83-106 and accompanying text.
106 N.M. 699, 749 P.2d 84 (1988).
Id. at 699, 749 P.2d at 84 (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-1-1 to 54-1-43 (1978)).
Id. at 704, 749 P.2d at 89.
Id.
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partnership affairs have been settled is appropriate where the third party
is a corporation which is the alter ego of the liquidating partner.'2 7
Plaintiff owned eighty-five percent of Turbine Eagle Charters (TEC),
a Subchapter S corporation created for the purpose of flying aircraft
charters. 128 Defendant, president and director of Crestview Aviation, entered into an oral agreement with plaintiff by which defendant obtained29
a share of TEC's profits as consideration for reducing service rates.
As part of another business venture, the defendant also told plaintiff
that they could purchase a Lear jet for $963,000, which they could then
lease. 30 After approval of the purchase, the parties borrowed money
from Sunwest Bank and assigned the jet as collateral.' 3' Sunwest wired
the money to the title company to consummate the sale for a total
purchase price of $963,000.132 Defendant, on behalf of Crestview Aviation,
entered into a purchase agreement with the seller to purchase the jet for
$860,000 and instructed the escrow agent for the title company to wire
133
the balance of $103,000 to the defendant's personal banking account.
A few months after the partnership was formed, defendant stated by
letter that he wanted to terminate his contract with TEC and asked for
a distribution of TEC profits.' 34 Four months later, defendant again wrote
plaintiff and advised him that all business relationships had terminated
effective April 16, 1985.13 Plaintiff informed defendant he would continue
to have obligations until all of the partnership affairs were completely
wound up.' 3 6 Plaintiff filed suit in equity seeking a partnership accounting.'

37

The district court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor.

138

Defendant appealed. 19
Defendant argued that the trial court could not award a personal
judgment to a partner in an action for an accounting. 14° The supreme
court disagreed, stating that "[a] court of equity has power not only to
state the account between the parties, but to enter judgment in favor of
one and against another as the state of the account may require.'"4
Defendant maintained that the court could not enter a judgment against
him because TEC owed him money for his share of the profits. 142 The

127. Id.
128. Id. at 700, 749 P.2d at 85.
129. Id.
130. Id.at 701, 749 P.2d at 86.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 702, 749 P.2d at 87.
139. Id.
140. Id. The judgment included $70,000 damages for fraud, $100,000 punitive damages, and onehalf of the expenses, interest payments and continuing obligations of the partnership. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Holman v. Cape, 45 Wash. 2d 205, 206, 273 P.2d 664, 665 (1954) (per curiam)
(quoting Yarwood v. Billings, 31 Wash. 542, 543, 72 P. 104, 105 (1903))).
142. Id.
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court found this position untenable because the partnership's obligations
to TEC exceeded any profits TEC owed to defendant.' 43 Because defendant
voluntarily terminated his contractual relationship with TEC, he was not
entitled to any net profits accrued after the termination date. 1 According
to the Uniform Partnership Act, the dissolution of a partnership does
not terminate the partnership's obligations until the winding up of its
affairs is complete.145 Plaintiff was entitled to a personal judgment because,
through TEC, he continued to pay the interest on the bank note and
the operating costs of the jet in order to preserve the partnership's
assets.146
The court stated that a personal judgment in favor of one partner
against another for outstanding obligations to third parties is generally
improper until all the partnership assets have been liquidated and the
debts have been paid. 147 However, the court conceded that "[t]he circumstances of a case may sometimes require a court of equity to disregard
the corporate entity and to look to the owner as the real party in
interest.'" 4 Because TEC and plaintiff were essentially one and the same,
it was not improper for plaintiff to obtain a money judgment for expenses
and interest payments made by TEC prior to the final balance being
ascertained. 149
The court held that although partners cannot sue each other at law
for acts relating to the partnership unless there is an accounting or prior
settlement, this action was not one at law, but one in equity seeking a
partnership accounting and settlement.' 50 Moreover, "[w]hen there is a
partnership accounting and defendant is charged with fraud and misconduct, defendant is answerable in that proceeding for all damages
sustained by plaintiff on account of defendant's breach of duty to the
firm.""'5
In Disharoon, the court interpreted the Uniform Partnership Act of
New Mexico and clarified important concepts relating to partnership
liabilities and responsibilities upon dissolution of the partnership, accounting of partnerships, and the award of money judgments prior to
a final accounting. It is most important to note that under Disharoon
a court of equity, in a suit for an accounting, may render a money
judgment against one of the parties if one partner incurred expenses
while preserving the assets of the partnership between the dissolution and
termination of the business.1 2

143. Id.
144. Id.
§ 54-1-30 (1978).
Levy, 106 N.M. at 703, 749 P.2d at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704, 749 P.2d at 89.
Id.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.

145. N.M. STAT. ANN.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

In Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick,'53 the supreme
court held that in-court settlements are enforceable if the attorney has
apparent authority to enter into the agreement. The court based its holding
15 4
on the public policy of New Mexico favoring settlement agreements.
The court also held that the failure of the tribe's representative to object
to the settlement gives an attorney the apparent authority needed to make
a settlement agreement.' 55 Prior to Hanosh, a New Mexico attorney needed
specific authority to bind a client to a settlement agreement, unless there
56
was an emergency or an overriding reason for enforcing the settlement.
The Hanosh decision deviates from the past and provides new strength
to the doctrine of apparent authority.
Plaintiff filed suit against Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick and General Motors
alleging breach of contract and conversion of monies for vehicles the
tribe had purchased. 5 7 The parties reached a proposed settlement agreement on the day of trial.'
The proposed settlement was read into the
record, with all of the parties approving the terms of the settlement in
open court.5 9 A representative of the tribe stated that he understood and
agreed to the terms of the settlement.' ° Later, plaintiff rejected the
proposed settlement and requested a new trial.' 6 ' The court granted the
63
defendant's motion to enter a stipulated settlement.

162

Plaintiff appealed.

In determining whether the district court erred in entering the stipulated
settlement order, the supreme court emphasized that the public policy
of New Mexico is to favor settlement agreements.'6 Furthermore, as
other jurisdictions have recognized, for public policy reasons courts must
enforce settlement agreements
entered into by attorneys who have apparent
65
authority to settle.

Apparent authority is "that authority which a principal holds his agent
out as possessing or permits him to exercise or to represent himself as
possessing under such circumstances as to estop the principal from denying

153. 106 N.M. 705, 749 P.2d 90 (1988).
154. Id. at 707, 749 P.2d at 93.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 707, 749 P.2d at 93 (citing Bolles v. Smith, 92 N.M. 524, 591 P.2d 278 (1979)). See
also Augustus v. John Williams & Associates, 92 N.M. 437, 589 P.2d 1028 (1979) (client bound
by attorney's settlement where client accepts benefits of settlement before attempting to treat settlement
as unauthorized and unenforceable).
157. Hanosh, 106 N.M. at 706, 749 P.2d at 91.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 706-07, 749 P.2d at 91-92.
163. Id. at 707, 749 P.2d at 92.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Glazer v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 616 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. .1980); Miotk v. Rudy,
4 Kan. App. 2d 296, 605 P.2d 587 (1980); Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510,
474 N.E.2d 1178 (1984), Johnson v. Tesky, 57 Or. App. 133, 643 P.2d 1344 (1982)).
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its existence."' 66 In general, an attorney does not have actual, implied,
or apparent authority to compromise his client's case. 67 However, the
court held that if the record reveals, as it did in this case, that an incourt settlement was reached and accepted by a representative
of the
68
party, apparent authority to settle can be inferred.
After Hanosh, a litigant no longer has to expressly give his or her
attorney the authority to settle if he knowingly permits his attorney to
exercise such authority on his behalf. As a result, parties who do not
expressly reject in-court settlement agreements, or who give their attorneys
apparent authority to settle, may be bound by settlement agreements that
they did not want to make.
VII.

EXPANSION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

In Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, 1 69 the supreme court, as it
did in Waisner v. Jones,170 announced a holding favoring the rights of
consumers. The court held that a bank's failure to pay interest due on
a customer's checking account, which the bank had solicited, violated
the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act.' 7' Although the bank's error
was unintentional, the court stated that an action for violation of the
72
act could succeed even though there was no intent to mislead.
In 1981, plaintiff Ashlock opened a high interest checking account at
defendant Sunwest Bank of Roswell in response to a mail solicitation. 73
Because of defendant's error, the defendant did not pay the plaintiff
any interest on the account for approximately five years. 74 When the
plaintiff discovered the error, he made several unsuccessful attempts to
persuade bank officials to pay back the interest due on the account. 7
When these efforts failed, the plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant
had violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act (the Act). 17 6 The trial court
found that the defendant had violated the Act by failing to pay interest
and the court awarded
the plaintiff $20,081.98 in damages. 77 The de78
fendant appealed.
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court outlined the four elements
which a complaining party must establish to prove a violation of the
Act: 1) the party charged must have made a false or misleading rep-

166. Id. at 707, 749 P.2d at 92 (quoting Tabet v. Campbell, 101 N.M. 334, 337, 681 P.2d II11,
1114 (1984) (quoting Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 97 N.M. 13, 19, 636 P.2d 284, 290 (1981))).
167. Id. at 707, 749 P.2d at 92.
168. Id.
169. 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988).
170. See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 103, 753 P.2d at 349 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -21 (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
172. Id.at 101, 753 P.2d at 347.
173. Id. at 100-01, 753 P.2d at 346-47.
174. Id.at 101, 753 P.2d at 347. The trial court calculated that the back interest which Ashlock
had not been paid amounted to approximately $20,000. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 100, 753 P.2d at 346.

Spring 1990]

COMMERCIAL

LAW

resentation; 2) the false or misleading statement must have been knowingly
made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan of goods or
services in the extension of credit or collection of debts; 3) the conduct
must have occurred in the regular course of the representor's trade or
commerce; and 4) the representation must have been of the type that
may, tends to, or does deceive or mislead any person.' 79 Further, the
court pointed to language in the Act that states that descriptions of
unfair or deceptive trade practices include the failure of a party to deliver
the quality of services contracted for. 80 The court held that all of these
elements existed when the defendant solicited the plaintiff and failed to
pay interest on the account as advertised.''
More significantly, the court held that none of the elements listed in
the Act require that the party charged have the willful intent to mislead.'8 2
The court said that if the legislature desired such an intent, they would
have so specified. 83 Given that the legislature allowed for treble damages
if a deceptive party is found to have willfully engaged in a deceptive
practice, the court reasoned that the legislature must also have anticipated
unintentional violations of the Act which could result in damages to a
consumer.'14 The court further reasoned that if purity of intent were a
defense to a deceptive act committed by a representing party, the Act
would become toothless due to the difficulty of proving willful intent.' 85
The court in Ashlock also held that although the defendant was organized under and regulated by federal law, the state law (the Unfair
18 6
Trade Practices Act) was not preempted by the federal legislation.
Relying on the principle that federal legislation will not necessarily preempt
state legislation merely because the two address the same area of law,
the court found no conflicts in the laws; hence both were applicable,
and the defendant was subject to the New Mexico Act.8 7
The holding in Ashlock regarding intent is not new. Prior to Ashlock
the court of appeals had stated that intent to deceive is not a requirement
of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.8 8 Ashlock is significant in that it
provides a rationale for that holding, thereby further clarifying the proper
use of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. However, as pointed out in the
concurring opinion, the holding virtually excises the language used in the

179. Id. at 101, 753 P.2d at 347. This language comes directly from the Unfair Practices Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
180. Ashlock, 107 N.M. at 101, 753 P.2d at 347. This language is taken from the Act. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(C)(17) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
181. Ashlock, 107 N.M. at 102, 753 P.2d at 348.
182. Id. at 101, 753 P.2d at 347.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 102, 753 P.2d at 348.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 102-03, 753 P.2d at 348-49.
188. In Richardson Ford Sales v. Johnson, 100 N.M. 779, 782, 676 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Ct. App.
1984), the court of appeals stated "[an intent to deceive is not a requirement under the New
Mexico [Unfair Trade Practices] statute."
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Act that a false or misleading statement must be "knowingly made."
VIII.

18 9

VIOLATION OF USURY LAW REQUIRES CONSCIOUS
INTENT

In Maulsby v. Magnuson,' 90 as in Ashlock, 9' the supreme court considered whether the word "knowingly" equates with conscious intent. In
Maulsby, the court, overruling a previous supreme court decision, 92 held
that a promissory note with an interest rate that was three percent above
the maximum rate allowed by law was not facially usurious, because no
party to the note intended a usurious interest rate. 93 The court, however,
limited the interest that could be collected on the note to the maximum

legal interest rate.'19
Plaintiff Maulsby filed suit against defendant Magnuson to recover a

one-third share of money due on a $45,000 promissory note signed by
the defendant and two others. 95 Under the terms of the note, the defendant
and the other signers agreed to repay the plaintiff the $45,000 plus
thirteen percent interest per year from the date of the note until full
payment.' 6 The thirteen percent interest rate was suggested by the signers,
but at the time the note was signed, that rate was three percent above
the maximum legal interest rate for secured debts.' 97 When the note
became due, all of the signers to the original note signed new separate
promissory notes to the plaintiff except the defendant. 98 The plaintiff
subsequently filed suit to recover the one-third share of the original note
owed by the defendant.'9 The trial court granted summary
judgment in
2
favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.

00

In affirming the trial court's decision that the note was not usurious,
the supreme court recognized that the key element in the case was whether
the term "knowingly done" as used in the usury statute meant that the

lender must have had a conscious intent to violate the law. 20 ' The court

acknowledged that in a previous case, Hays v. Hudson, 2 2 the court
189. Ashlock, 107 N.M. at 103, 753 P.2d at 349 (Stowers, J., specially concurring).
190. 107 N.M. 223, 755 P.2d 67 (1988). See supra notes 169-189
and accompanying text.
191. 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988).
192. Id. at 225, 755 P.2d at 69. The court overruled Hays v. Hudson, 85 N.M. 512, 514 P.2d
31 (1973), in which the court held that a party could violate usury laws without having the conscious
intent to violate the law. Id. at 513, 514 P.2d at 32.
193. Maulsby, 107 N.M. at 226, 755 P.2d at 70.
194. Id.

195. Id.at 223, 755 P.2d at 67.
196. Id.

197. Id.at 224, 755 P.2d at 68. The maximum legal interest rate of 10 percent for secured loans
was set by statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-11 (1978), repealed, 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 263 § 4.
Under the new provisions, the maximum legal interest shall be the rate agreed to in writing by the
parties, subject to disclosure provisions. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-8-11.1 to -11.3 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
198. Id.
199. Id.

200. Id. at 223, 755 P.2d at 67.
201. Id. at 225, 755 P.2d at 69.
202. 85 N.M. 512, 514 P.2d 31 (1973). See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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adopted the view that no conscious intent to violate the usury law was
necessary; the lender need only take an amount of interest in excess of
the maximum allowed by law.203 In Maulsby, the court recognized that
Hays was out of line with the general rule regarding usury and New
Mexico law prior to the Hays decision. 204
The court's rationale was that usury laws are meant to protect the
needy from paying exorbitant interest rates or suffering from other
exploitation due to unsavory lending practices. 2 5 In this case, none of
2
the parties were needy, and in fact the signers set the interest rate. 06
Since the lender never intended a usurious interest rate, it should not
be barred from collecting interest on the loan. 2°7
The holding in Maulsby was not a dramatic departure for the court.
Instead, the court merely corrected what appears to have been a deviation
from its previous holdings regarding usury. Prior to Hays, the law in
New Mexico was well settled that usury violations required intent. 208 The
realignment in Maulsby with this previously settled principle prevents
accidental violations of usury laws by unsuspecting lenders.
IX.

THE EFFECT OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT ON
CONTRACT FORMATION

In Western Commerce Bank v. Gillespie,209 the supreme court held
that a settlement offer was a valid contract that could not be repudiated
210
on the grounds that a condition precedent existed to its formation.
The court held that performance of the contract, not its formation, was
conditional. 21'
As creditor of an estate, plaintiff Western Commerce Bank sued the
defendants, the personal representatives and heirs of the estate, for
payment on an unpaid promissory note. 2 2 The defendants offered ' to
21 3
settle the suit "subject to the [defendants] obtaining ... financing.
The plaintiff accepted the settlement offer but repudiated two months
later because the defendants had not secured the financing. 21 4 On motion
by the defendants, the trial215court ordered enforcement of the settlement
and the plaintiff appealed.

203. Maulsby, 107 N.M. at 225, 755 P.2d at 69.
204. Id.
205. Id.at 226, 755 P.2d at 70.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g.,Priestley v. Law, 33 N.M. 176, 181, 262 P. 931, 934 (1927); American Inv. v.
Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 9, 218 P. 183, 185 (1923); Armijo v. Henry, 14 N.M. 181, 192, 89 P. 305,
308 (1907).
209. 108 N.M. 535, 775 P.2d 737 (1989).
210. Id. at 538, 775 P.2d at 740.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 536, 775 P.2d at 738.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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In affirming the trial court's decision that the settlement agreement
was enforceable, the supreme court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the defendants' arrangement of financing constituted a condition precedent
to formation of the contract. 2 6 Instead, the court recognized that
"[g]enerally, a condition precedent is an event occurring subsequently to
the formation
of a valid contract, ' 2 1 7 i.e., it conditions performance of
21
1
contract.
the
While not changing the law of contracts, Western is significant in that
the court used the case to explain two previous decisions which could
be misread to imply that a condition precedent does qualify formation
of a contract. 2 9 The court stated that despite the language in Elephant
Butte Resort Marina v. Woolridge220 and in Wyrsch v. Milke, 221 neither
case, the court said, supported the proposition that a condition precedent
qualified the formation of the contract. 222 The court further held that,
while the parties could agree to conditions to the formation of a contract,
the general rule is that a2 3 condition precedent normally qualifies performance of the contract.
X.

CORPORATIONS

The Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil
In Scott v. AZL Resources,224 the supreme court reiterated guidelines
for piercing the corporate veil in New Mexico. 22 1 This equitable relief
will be available when three requirements are satisfied: 1) a showing of
instrumentality or domination; 2) improper purpose; and 3) proximate
causation. 226 The court stated that the limited liability granted to the
owners of corporate entities is a basic principle of corporate law and
"[o]nly under special circumstances will the courts disregard the corporate
entity to pierce the corporate veil holding individual shareholders or a
parent corporation liable. ' 2 27 While it is not clear what circumstances
would allow a court to disregard the limited liability of shareholders,

A.

216. Id. at 538, 775 P.2d at 740.
217. Id. at 537, 775 P.2d at 739 (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 102 N.M. 286, 694 P.2d 1351 (1985). The language in Elephant Butte to which the court
was referring was "a condition precedent is a condition ... which must be met before the contract
is formed." Elephant Butte, 102 N.M. at 289, 694 P.2d at 1354.
221. 92 N.M. 217, 585 P.2d 1098 (Ct. App. 1978). The language in Wyrsch to which the court
was referring was: "[The defendants] did not obtain [the cross-claimant's] consent within a reasonable
time to fulfill the condition precedent which would have given rise to a binding contract." Wyrsch,
92 N.M. at 221, 585 P.2d at 1102.
222. Western, 108 N.M. at 537, 775 P.2d at 739.
223. Id.
224. 107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897 (1988).
225. Id. at 119, 753 P.2d at 898. The court of appeals had previously set out this three-part
test in Harlow v. Fibron, 100 N.M. 379, 382, 671 P.2d 40, 43 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M.
439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983).
226. Scott, 107 N.M. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900.
227. Id.
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the court held that in this case there
was not substantial evidence to
22
support piercing the corporate veil. 1
Plaintiff Scott claimed that Baca Grande Corporation, a corporation
wholly-owned by defendant AZL, breached an employment contract with
Scott. 2 9 The trial court pierced the corporate veil and found the defendant
and several of its wholly-owned subsidiary corporations jointly and severally liable for the judgment against Baca Grande. 2 0 In support of its
conclusion, the trial court found that defendant's subsidiary corporations
were used for an improper purpose and that defendant's control over
its subsidiaries proximately caused plaintiff's damages. 231
The supreme court reversed, holding that there was not substantial
evidence to support the finding that AZL used the subsidiary corporation
for an improper purpose, 23 2 even if the subsidiary was an "alter ego"
of AZL. 233 The court stated that a basic proposition of corporate law
is that a corporation will ordinarily be treated as a legal entity separate
from its shareholders. 23 4 The court stressed that "[m]ere control by the
parent corporation is not enough to warrant piercing the corporate veil,
[and that] some form of moral culpability attributable to the parent,
such as use of the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud is required.' '235
B.

Forged Proxies as Newly Discovered Evidence
In Pena v. Westland Development Co.,2316 the court of appeals ruled
on five issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by not allowing plaintiffs
to challenge the proxies they had earlier agreed not to challenge; 2)
whether all owners of jointly owned shares must sign a proxy in order
to make it valid; 3) whether the votes reflecting Class B shares should
have been counted in the election of the board of directors; 4) whether
a second proxy submitted revokes an earlier submitted proxy; and 5) to
23 7
what extent a shareholder's intent controls how his proxies are counted.

228. Id. at 120, 753 P.2d at 899.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 122, 735 P.2d at 901.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900. Piercing the corporate veil in any but the most extreme
circumstances could discourage economic growth and activity.
235. Id. at 122, 753 P.2d at 901 (citing Harlow, 100 N.M. at 382, 671 P.2d at 43). Although
the plaintiff showed that Baca Grande was undercapitalized during its existence, there was no evidence
that it was undercapitalized at the time of its incorporation. Id. The plaintiff also showed that
Baca Grande used a "zero-balance account" and AZL took all excess funds from the account. Id.
However, the supreme court stated that because there was no commingling of funds and evidence
was presented that AZL used the account "to avoid having money sitting idle," no improper purpose
existed. Id. Further, in order to show improper purpose, a plaintiff must prove that the "financial
set-up of the corporation is a sham and causes an injustice." Id. The facts that AZL's subsidiaries
did business in their own names, received income in their own accounts and owned valuable assets
proved to the court that the subsidiaries were not sham corporations. Id.
236. 107 N.M. 560, 761 P.2d 438 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988)).
237. Id.at 563-67, 761 P,2d at 441-44.
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The case gave the court its first opportunity to settle these numerous
issues for New Mexico.
The facts of the case were fairly complex. Clara Pena, Barbara Page,
and Polecarpio Anaya (plaintiffs) ran as a nonmanagement slate in the
election to select the defendant's board of directors. 238 Some shareholders
cast ballots at the November 16, 1985, shareholders' meeting, and other
shareholders voted by proxy. 23 9 While the ballots were being counted,4
disputes arose between the management and nonmanagement factions.2 0
On December 4, 1985, Pena filed a complaint requesting a temporary
restraining order to halt the counting of the votes, and she requested
the appointment of a special master to count the votes and to deal with
the numerous challenges to the proxies.'24 On December 5, the trial court
granted the TRO. 242 Afterwards, the trial court ordered the counting to
continue, subject to certain restrictions.2 4 Still more disputes arose and
Pena requested further intervention from the trial court. 2" The trial court
24
imposed more restrictions by granting another TRO. 1
On January 3, 1986, the court appointed a special master to supervise
the proceedings. 2" After numerous special master meetings, both sides
agreed that 966 nonmanagement proxies and 918 management proxies
would not be challenged. 247 None of the proxies were challenged on the
basis of forgery.248
On January 31, 1986, the trial court held a hearing to rule on the
parties' objections to the proxies. 249 Afterwards, the ballots and proxies
were given to a private accounting firm to be counted. 2 0 On April 29,
Pena moved to allow a renewal of her objections to the uncontested
proxies based on the fact that after the special master's proceedings a
number of forgeries had been discovered. 2 ' It had taken Pena until the
end of April to obtain copies of enough of the forged proxies to change
253
the results of the election. 2 2 The trial court denied Pena's motion.
The trial was held on July 15, 1986, with most of the time taken up
by plaintiffs' offer of proof concerning the forged proxies. 2 4 The trial
court entered judgment establishing the management slate as the winners

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Pena, 107 N.M. at 562, 761 P.2d at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court of appeals did not say what the restrictions were.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court of appeals did not discuss the reasons for the denial of the motion.
Id. at 563, 761 P.2d at 441.
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of the election. 255 A change of 500 votes (out of 300,000 votes total)
from management candidates to nonmanagement candidates would have
elected two nonmanagement candidates .26
As to the first issue, whether the trial court erred by not allowing
plaintiffs to challenge the proxies they had earlier agreed not to challenge,
the court found the situation analogous to a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence or a Rule 60(B) motion to set aside
a judgment based on such evidence. 2 7 This case involved evidence discovered after the conclusion of the special master proceeding, and the
plaintiffs were in effect asking the court of appeals to reopen that
proceeding to change the result. 258 The court held that the applicable
25 9
principle of review would therefore be that of a motion for a new trial.
The court held that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. 260 The court's review
was therefore limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs
to raise the forgery issue with
26
respect to the unchallenged proxies. '
The court named six prerequisites for granting a motion for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) the new evidence would
probably change the result; (2) it has been discovered since the trial; (3)
it could not have been discovered before the trial through the exercise
of due diligence; (4) it is material to the issues in the case; (5) it is not
26 2
merely cumulative; and (6) it is not merely impeaching or contradictory.
The court found that the new evidence in this case would have probably
changed the result had it been accepted by the trial court. 263 There was
evidence of over 3500 invalid votes. 2 " The new evidence was discovered
after the last special master meeting.2 65 It was also material as to who
legitimately won the election. 2 " According to the court, the evidence was
not cumulative, as it was the only evidence concerning the forged proxies,
267
nor was it merely contradictory or impeaching.
The court found room for contention, however, over whether the
forgeries could have been discovered before the end of the special master
meetings through the exercise of due diligence.2 68 The plaintiffs had two
months from the date of the election to the end of the special master

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564, 761 P.2d at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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proceedings to uncover the alleged forgeries. 269 Given the short period
of time to act, and the fact that there was no reason to suspect that
forgeries had occurred, the court found that 27plaintiffs
exercised due
0
diligence in making their challenges to proxies.
Under the circumstances, the court found that the plaintiffs met the
requirements for a new trial. 27' The trial court denied plaintiffs the
opportunity to verify the 1800 signatures on the proxies due to the
amount of time it would take. 272 While recognizing concerns for expediency
the court held that those concerns could not overcome the requirement
that each side be allowed a full and fair opportunity to litigate all material
31
issues.

27

To ensure a fair election and to deter future conduct of this sort, the
court held that the plaintiffs should have been allowed to raise the issue
of the forged proxies and have the trial court rule on them. 274 The court
ordered that on remand, both sides should have a chance to conduct
discovery regarding the alleged forgeries and to cross-examine all wit-

nesses

275

As to the second issue, whether all owners of jointly owned shares
must sign a proxy in order to make it valid, the court held that a fair
and reasonable approach would be that a proxy signed by only one joint
owner is presumptively valid. 27 6 They held that this presumption could
be overcome by a showing that the nonsigning joint owners did not agree
with the vote on the proxy. 27 7 The court stated that this approach.comported with the policy that stockholders should not be disenfranchised
27
unless their purported vote is meaningless. 1
Plaintiffs next argued that the proxies with "signatures" printed on
them instead of being signed were void as a matter of law. In answering
this contention, the court relied on Costilla Estates Development v.
Mascarenas,279 where the court stated: "Generally a signature, if adopted
as such, may be printed, lithographed, or typewritten, as well as written. ' ' 210 Based on that language, the court held that if a party intends
the purported signature to be a signature, it will be treated as such. 21'
Thus, the trial court had correctly ruled that the proxies were presumptively valid, and plaintiffs had the opportunity to rebut that presumption,
2 2
which they did not do. 1

269.
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272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564-65, 761 P.2d at 442-43.
Id. at 565, 761 P.2d at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
33 N.M. 356, 267 P. 74 (1928).
Id. at 364, 267 P. at 77.
Pena, 107 N.M. at 565, 761 P.2d at 443.
Id. at 566, 761 P.2d at 444.
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As to the third issue, whether the votes reflecting Class B shares should
have been counted in the election of the board of directors, the court
held that not including Class B shareholders in the vote disenfranchised
them. 28 3 The court found that plaintiffs had the opportunity to solicit
votes from the Class B owners and were not prejudiced by the omission
28 4
of the Class B shares from the list of voters and shares entitled to vote.
The fourth issue, concerning double proxies, was raised by Westland
Development. Twenty-three shareholders had indicated support for the
nonmanagement slate on their first proxy. 285 On the subsequently submitted
management proxies, the shareholders indicated they did not support the
management slate. 28 6 Westland argued that the second proxy was in effect

an abstention and revoked the earlier submitted proxy. 2 7 The court held
that a presumption by the trial court that the shareholders intended to
vote for the nonmanagement candidates appeared to have carried out
the shareholders' intent. 28 This equitable result was in accordance with
the rationale that proxies of small shareholders of a corporation should
and evaluated so that the shareholders' wishes are not
be scrutinized
2
frustrated . 9
The last issue, concerning what extent a shareholder's intent controls
how his proxies are counted, related to two separate shareholders. First,
an individual shareholder voted for the management candidates in his
first proxy and for the nonmanagement candidates in his second proxy. 29°
The court held that consistency required that the shareholder's intent
control. 291 An examination of the shareholder's deposition demonstrated
a clear intent to vote for the management candidates. 292 The court held
293
that on remand, these votes were to be counted in favor of management.
Finally, another shareholder attempted to split his votes among the three
294
nonmanagement candidates and one of the management candidates.
There was no authority shown which would prevent him from splitting
his votes. 295 On remand, the trial court was directed296to determine the
shareholder's intent and enter a decision accordingly.
XI.

LEASES

Court Imposed Modification of Residential Lease
New Mexico courts have been reluctant to interfere with the right to
contract. "When discerning the purpose, meaning, and intent of the

A.

283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 567, 761 P.2d at 445.
289. Id. (citing Cupo v. Community National Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y., 324 F. Supp. 1390
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1971)).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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parties to a contract, the court's duty is confined to interpreting the
contract that the parties made for themselves, and absent any ambiguity,
the court may not alter or fabricate a new agreement for the parties. "297
However, in Ramirez-Eames v. Hovar,298 the supreme court held that the
Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act 29 (the Act) modified the contract
rule by allowing a court to selectively enforce a lease agreement to obtain
an equitable result.3a°
In Ramirez-Eames v. Hovar, plaintiff (lessee) and defendant (lessor)
entered into a residential lease agreement on August 8, 1987, providing
that plaintiff would lease an apartment for a period of one year beginning
October 1, 1987, at a rental of $850 per month.30 1 On August 30, 1987,
plaintiff informed defendant of her intention not to rent the apartment
and requested a refund of the damage deposit.3 0 2 When the defendant
denied that request, plaintiff filed this action to recover her deposit. 0 a
The trial court found that plaintiff repudiated a valid lease contract
prior to the beginning of the lease period.31 4 The trial court found that
the fair market rental rate was $725 per month since that was the amount
for which defendant was able to rent the apartment to a third party.3 5
Therefore, in equity, the trial court held that plaintiff should not be
forced to pay the difference between the contract rate and3 °6the rate
actually received by defendant for the period of the contract.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that
the Act authorized the trial court's decision.30 7 The court held that the
Act allowed the trial court to make a determination of the underlying
fairness of the rental agreement and allow selective enforcement of the
contract to bring about an equitable result.30 Based on its reading of
the Act, the court adopted a standard of inequity rather than a standard
of unconscionability in order to trigger the equitable power of the trial
court to modify the contract between a residential lessor and lessee.°9
The dissent argued that the inequity standard was nebulous and that
innumerable rental agreements were now fair game for litigation or

renegotiation .310
Course of Dealing Waiver
In Easterling v. Peterson,311 the supreme court considered whether
summary judgment is appropriate when one party raises the issue of
B.
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CC Housing Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rental, 106 N.M. 577, 579, 746 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1987).
108 N.M. 520, 775 P.2d 722 (1989).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-1 to -52 (Repl. Pamp. 1982 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
Ramirez-Eames, 108 N.M. at 522, 775 P.2d at 724.
Id. at 521, 775 P.2d at 723.
Id. Plaintiff did offer to pay the leasing agent fee. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 521, 522, 775 P.2d at 723, 724.
Id. at 523, 775 P.2d at 725.
Id. at 522, 755 P.2d at 724.
Id. at 522-23, 775 P.2d at 724-25.
Id. at 524, 775 P.2d at 726 (Scarborough, J., dissenting).
107 N.M. 123, 753 P.2d 902 (1988).
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waiver of a contractual right through a course of dealing. The supreme
court had previously held that waivers can be implied by a course of
dealing3 1 2 and that the existence of a waiver is a factual issue.313 The
Easterlingcourt held that questions of waiver of contractual rights between
a lessee and lessor are questions of fact 14 and that it was inappropriate
for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the breach of contract
issues without hearing the waiver issue." 5
Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract and damages resulting
from defendant's entry into premises subleased by plaintiff after plaintiff
failed to pay rent on time. 1 6 Plaintiff Easterling had assumed a lease
of commercial space from defendant Peterson.3 17 Over a fifteen-month
period, plaintiff consistently paid her rent late with added late charges.3 "8
In April 1985, with plaintiff three months behind in rental payments,
defendant reentered the premises and locked plaintiff out.3 19 Plaintiff
320
sued defendant for lost income and opportunity to resell her business.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, finding there
were no 1material issues of fact concerning default, notice, and right of
2
reentry.1
The supreme court stated that "[tihe general rules are that acceptance
of rent with knowledge of an existing breach constitutes a waiver of the
right of forfeiture for such breach, and that if, by his words and conduct
a
a landlord has led his tenant to believe that he would not enforce 322
right of forfeiture, he will be estopped to avail himself of a forfeiture.
Under the holding of Easterling, if a lessor consistently accepts late rental
payments without enforcing his contractual rights, a waiver created by
that course of dealing may exist and the lessor may be found to be
estopped from asserting his rights. This issue was raised by the pleadings
of fact. 323 The suit, therefore, was not
and the determination was one
3 24
judgment.
summary
subject to
XII.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

In Edwards v. Mesch,3 25 the supreme court clarified the right
of a holder of a negotiable instrument to sue as the real party in

312. Id. at 124, 753 P.2d at 903 (citing Green v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 106 N.M.
523, 746 P.2d 152 (1987) and Elephant Butte Resort Marina v. Woolridge, 102 N.M. 286, 694 P.2d
1351 (1985)).
313. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982).
314. Easterling, 107 N.M. at 124, 753 P.2d at 903.
315. Id.at 124, 125, 753 P.2d at 903, 904.
316. Id.at 123, 753 P.2d at 902.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 124, 753 P.2d at 903.
322. Id.(citing 3A G. THoMPsoN, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 1329 (Repl. 1981)).
323. See Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M. at 102, 654 P.2d at 555.
324. Easterling, 107 N.M. at 123-24, 753 P.2d at 903-04.
325. 107 N.M. 704, 763 P.2d 1169 (1988).
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interest.126 The court held that a payee in possession of a negotiable
instrument may act to collect on that instrument even if the instrument
had been assigned to a third party.3 27 The court stated that the defendant
would not be exposed to double liability because the Uniform Commercial
Code provides protection to a party who makes payment to the holder
3 2
of a negotiable instrument.

1

Defendant Mesch executed a promissory note in favor of plaintiffs
Edwards.129 Subsequently, plaintiffs transferred their interest to a closely
held corporation.330 Defendant defaulted on the note.33' Plaintiffs sued
to collect and prevailed at trial.33 2 On appeal, defendant argued that
plaintiffs were not the real party in interest because the plaintiffs had
transferred their interest in the note and therefore did not have standing
to sue.333
In affirming the trial court's decision, the supreme court held that a
"holder" of a negotiable instrument is "a person who is in possession
of . . .an instrument .. .drawn, issued or endorsed to him, to his order
or to bearer or in blank.

334

The court concluded that since plaintiffs

were payees and holders of the note, they could enforce payment even
after they had assigned it to the corporation.3 35 As the owner of the
right being enforced and as the party in position to discharge the defendant
from the liability, plaintiffs were indeed the real party in interest.33 6
SUZANNE G. LUBAR
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326. Id. at 705, 763 P.2d at 1170. The court had decided cases concerning the rights of holders
when seeking payment on a note as far back as the last century and the early part of this century.
See, e.g., Spears v. Sutherland, 37 N.M. 356, 23 P.2d 622 (1933); Tompkins v. Rains, 26 N.M.
631, 195 P. 800 (1921); Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. 34, 51 (1853), aff'd, 61 U.S. 176 (1857).
In Tompkins, the court held that "... when a payee had possession of a note at trial, even if
the note bore the endorsement of payee to a third party, '[t]he general rule is that in such instances
the payee in the note is presumed to be the owner thereof and may maintain the suit."' Edwards,
107 N.M. at 706, 763 P.2d at 1171 (quoting Tompkins, 26 N.M. at 633, 195 P. at 800-01).
327. Edwards, 107 N.M. at 706, 763 P.2d at 1171.
328. Id. The court quoted from N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-603(1) (1978): "The liability of any
party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is
made with knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument.
The discharge from
liability does have certain specific restrictions such as bad faith. Id.
329. Edwards, 107 N.M. at 705, 763 P.2d at 1170.
330. Id. John Edwards owned all the shares of the corporation. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Edwards, 107 N.M. at 705, 763 P.2d at 1170 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-201(20)
(Cum. Supp. 1988)).
335. Edwards, 107 N.M. at 706, 763 P.2d at 1171.
336. Id. (citing Sup. CT. RULES ANN. 1-017(A) & (B) (1986)).

